Toddlers Provide Help Specific to the Cause of Others' Failed Actions

• In Event: 1-147 - Keeping Others in Mind: New Evidence for Selective and Effective Prosociality in Toddlers and Young Children

Integrative Statement

From infancy, humans help others achieve their goals, revealing an early emerging motivation to act prosocially (e.g., Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Yet, motivation alone does not explain how we figure out “how to help” – that is, what to do in order to offer effective help. One critical aspect of determining how to help is a causal analysis of the situation: What is the source of the helpee's problem, and what can be done to address it? Prior research suggests that young children draw sophisticated causal inferences from sparse evidence (e.g., Gopnik et al., 2001), even inferring the cause of their own failed actions given minimal statistical information (Gweon, & Schulz, 2011). Much remains unknown, however, about how causal reasoning might inform young children’s prosocial decisions and actions, supporting their ability to figure out how best to help.

Across three studies, we investigate 16- to 48-month-olds' abilities to reason about why others fail, and to offer help that appropriately addresses the cause of their failures. In all experiments, children observed an adult fail to activate one of two toys because she either (a) used a faulty toy (Wrong Toy condition) or (b) used a functioning toy incorrectly (Wrong Action condition). The critical question was whether children would provide help that addressed the likely cause of the adult’s failure either by handing her the other toy, which was functional (Wrong Toy condition) or by flipping over one of the toys to reveal the functional button on the other side (Wrong Action condition). In Experiment 1 (24- to 48-month-olds; N=64), children in the Wrong Toy condition were more likely to hand the adult the other toy than children in the Wrong Action condition. Notably, although most children in the Wrong Action condition readily flipped a toy over to show the adult the functional button on the other side, they did not preferentially act on either toy, presumably because the toys were identical and thus interchangeable. In Experiment 2 (24- to 48-month-olds; N=72), we made the toys visually and structurally distinct. The results replicated the key findings in Experiment 1, and additionally, children in the Wrong Toy condition showed a preference to reveal the functional button on the toy the adult tried but failed to activate. This finding suggests that children not only inferred the cause of the adult’s failure but also the specificity of her goal (i.e., “She wants to activate this toy”, rather than “She wants to activate either toy.”). Experiment 3’s preliminary results suggest that even 16- to 24-month-olds (N=56/60) may be able to infer the cause of another’s failed action and provide appropriate help.

Together these results suggest that young children are not just motivated to help others; they are selective, flexible, and effective in the help that they provide. Even before their second birthday, children readily recruit their causal knowledge to reason about the causes behind others’ failed actions and offer help that addresses the source of the problem.

Authors

• Sophie Bridgers, Stanford University
  Presenting Author

• Sara Altman, Stanford University
  Non-Presenting Author

• Hyowon Gweon, Stanford University
  Non-Presenting Author