Religious differences in anthropomorphism of God along varying dimensions

• In Event: 2-192 - Cultural and religious differences in anthropomorphism of technology, nature, fictional characters, and supernatural agents

Integrative Statement

Building on recent studies outlining a dimensional structure of anthropomorphism in adults and children, the current study examined if children from different religious backgrounds have varying degrees of anthropomorphism in their concepts of God along three dimensions: mentalizing, physical embodiment, and causal agency.

Participants were 219 children between the ages of 3.25 and 6.92 (M = 4.536, SD = .660, 57.5% female). Participants were diverse in religious affiliation (30% Protestant, 27% Muslim, 22% Catholic, 21% Non-Affiliated). To measure views of God’s embodiment, children answered 6 questions about whether or not God has physical (e.g., gets wet in the rain) and biological (e.g., needs to eat) characteristics (-2 = no, really sure; +2 = yes, really sure). Children completed a 2-step Perception Knowledge test examining the attribution of mental state limitations to God and humans. Children were coded for their level of theory of mind understanding (non-representational, early representational, fully representational). Finally, to test anthropomorphism in causal agency, children completed 4 questions indicating if God could make impossible things possible (e.g., to let someone walk through a wall).

Analyses indicated religious group differences in anthropomorphism as well as differentiation in the different dimensions of anthropomorphism. Physical embodiment of God significantly decreased with age [r = -.189, p = .005], although there was a significant effect of religious affiliation [F(3,212) = 10.997, p = .000, partial n2 = .135]. Specifically, Protestant and Non-Affiliated children were somewhat sure that God does have physical characteristics, Catholic children were generally unsure that God has embodiment, but Muslim children were somewhat sure that God does not have physical characteristics.

Analyses of children’s association of mental state limitations to God indicate that children who had a fully representational understanding of the human mind were more likely than other children to associate knowledge limitations to God [Kruskal-Wallis (unequal distributions), p < .000]. As with embodiment, however, this pattern differed by religious group. Non-Affiliated and Catholic children demonstrated this same developmental pattern (100% and 80% of fully representational children, respectively). Protestant children had a similar pattern (50% of fully representational children), but were less likely to associate mental state limitations to God when they reached a fully representational understanding of human minds. In contrast, Muslim children, even those were fully representational, were unlikely to associate mental state limitations to God (45% of fully representational children).

Finally, regarding causal agency, Catholic and Non-Affiliated children remained generally uncertain about whether or not God could make impossible things possible. In contrast, Protestant children increased in attributing the impossible to God, although only remained “a little sure” about God’s abilities; and Muslim children were generally “very sure” that God could make the impossible become possible.

In summary, Muslim children demonstrated the weakest anthropomorphism of God across all dimensions, associating minimal human-like limitations to God at any age. In contrast, Non-Affiliated children had the strongest anthropomorphism of God; and Protestant and Catholic children varied in the degree of anthropomorphism by dimension. These findings suggest interactions between cultural input and social cognition in children’s developing concepts of God.

Author

• Rebekah Ann Richert, University of California, Riverside
  Presenting Author