Young Children’s Conceptualization of Conflicting Empirical Claims

• In Event: When Children Navigate Misinformation and Disagreement, how far Does Evidence Matter?

Abstract

When faced with disagreement, children are prone to accept the majority verdict (Morgan et al., 2015). However, children often encounter situations in which two informants make directly conflicting claims. Prior research suggests a developmental improvement in children’s ability to recognize cases where immediate, clear-cut adjudication of a disagreement is impossible (Wainryb et al., 2004). However, the findings invite an important follow-up question: do children realize that such disagreements can often be adjudicated if further empirical evidence becomes available? This question was examined in two, online experiments with children aged 5-7 years and 9-11 years. A total sample of 144 children was recruited in China (N = 72, Experiment 1) and in the US (N = 72, Experiment 2).

Children in both experiments heard two informants make conflicting, empirical claims about each of 4 scenarios. For example, one informant claimed that a particular ball would float when dropped in water whereas the other informant claimed that it would sink. Children were asked to judge the claim made by each informant, both prior to and after the presentation of relevant evidence (e.g., the ball was shown to sink when dropped in water). Prior to presentation of the relevant evidence, a global age change was detected. Specifically, older children mostly judged that both informants could be right whereas younger children often judged one informant to be right and the other wrong (Figure 1). This age change was significant for both the Chinese sample (p < .001) and the US sample (p < .01). After the presentation of relevant evidence, both age groups appropriately judged one informant to be right and the other wrong.

We also examined children’s justifications for their judgments about the two informants. Children’s pre-evidence justifications were coded for whether or not they expressed uncertainty (e.g., “The ball will sink if it is solid, but float if it is hollow.”). Children’s post-evidence justifications were coded for whether or not they referenced evidence to resolve the uncertainty (e.g., “The boy in blue was right because in the video the ball sank.”). Across both cultures, older children were more likely than younger children to make references to uncertainty in the pre-evidence phase and to evidence that resolved the uncertainty in the post-evidence phase (p < .001). Moreover, the effect of phase (i.e., pre-evidence vs. post-evidence) on children’s references to uncertainty-related justifications was greater for younger children than for older children (Figure 2). This finding highlights younger children’s developing awareness that conflicting claims can be adjudicated following pertinent evidence, despite their tendency to deny uncertainty when faced with disagreement.

In sum, older children tend to suspend judgement when conceptualizing hitherto unresolved empirical disagreements, whereas younger children tend to make a preemptive judgment. Nevertheless, in the wake of decisive evidence, both age groups draw appropriate conclusions about which of two claims is right. Children’s justification imply that older children are more likely than younger children to conceptualize the uncertainty of empirical disagreement and the dynamic process by which disagreement can be adjudicated via relevant evidence.

Group Authors

N/A

Authors

• Qianru Tiffany Yang, Harvard University
  Presenting Author

• Selesteel Sleight

• Samuel Ronfard, University of Toronto

• Paul Harris, Harvard University