Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Panel
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Topic Area
Browse Posters
Search Tips
Register for SRCD23
Personal Schedule
Welcome Letter
Program Guide
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
Although memory is fundamental to complex human behaviour and facilitates a variety of other cognitive processes, its capacity and precision is severely restricted (Cowan, 2014; Buschman et al., 2011). To our benefit, however, humans are able to recognise, strategically compensate for, and artificially shift such cognitive performance limits (Bulley, Redshaw & Suddendorf, 2020). Writing lists, setting alarms, and leaving objects in conspicuous places are just a few of the ways that we utilise external resources to compensate for the memory limits of our “naked minds” – thereby offloading internal cognitive demands into the external world (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Heersmink, 2013; Sutton, 2010). Indeed, using physical actions or external artefacts to alter the information processing requirements of a task so as to alleviate cognitive demand, or cognitive offloading, provides humans with formidable means to solve problems and bypass otherwise unassailable cognitive limits (Risko & Gilbert, 2016).
Previous studies have established baseline levels of competence for children’s selective and spontaneous use of cognitive offloading (Armitage et al., 2020; Bulley et al., 2020; Redshaw et al., 2018), though their general proficiency in distributing finite external resources across cognitive tasks has remained unknown. The current study examined children’s capacity for cognitive offloading in a task in which a limited number of external reminders could be distributed to assist future memory performance. Across three experimental phases, children aged 6 to 9 years (N = 120) were tasked with remembering the hiding locations of 1, 3, 5 and 7 targets under an array of 25 cups (see Figure 1). In Phase 1, children had to rely on internal cognitive processing alone to encode and recall the target cups. In Phase 2, children were instructed to use physical tokens as reminders by placing them on every target cup. Critically, in Phase 3, children were provided with a limited number of tokens and advised to distribute them among the upcoming four trials. Finally, following the Phase 3 search period, children were asked to reflect on their earlier allocation of tokens and were given the opportunity to adjust this allocation in accordance with their task performance.
As seen in Figure 2, 8- to 9-year-old children allocated proportionately more tokens to more difficult Phase 3 trials (F(1, 58) = 81.89, p < .001, ηp² = .59), whereas 6- to 7-year-old children did not (F(1, 58) = 0.55, p = .463, ηp² = .01). When given the opportunity to revise their token allocation after experiencing the consequences of their initial approach, however, younger children (r(118) = -.288, p = .001) and children who performed poorly in Phase 3 (r(118) = -.379, p < .001) were more likely to adjust their allocation in line with task demands. These results demonstrate that children can selectively allocate limited external resources in proportion to internal cognitive load to improve their own future performance. The developmental pattern likely reflects transformations in children’s ability to weigh up internal and external solutions to cognitive problems.