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For many years, Vietnam was the posterchild for wartime devastation and the need for remediation in the aftermath of conflict; indeed, the term “ecocide” was coined during the war to describe the deliberate targeting of the environment during hostilities. The country experienced the first widespread use of chemical herbicides (such as Agent Orange) in war, sprayed from C-123s over vast areas of the countryside, leading to defoliation and long-term health damages, as well as a number of other physical landscape impacts from bombings, Rome plows, and military base building, among others. However, very little information about Vietnam’s approaches to post-war remediation, including how knowledge was generated about concepts such as ‘contamination’ and ‘baselines’; who was enrolled in both idealizing and carrying out remediation activities; and ultimately the successes and failures of multiple approaches to restoration, have been compiled or examined. This paper will compare case studies of several different remediation histories in Vietnam since 1975, including areas of “natural” regeneration, whereby non-human agents recolonized and reconfigured blasted landscapes; “passive” regeneration, whereby a combination of human and non-human activity on small scales altered trajectories of living-together ; and “active” regeneration, where scientists and publics, with large amounts of funding and explicit remediation agendas, enacted technocratic actions towards a set (but often unachievable) baseline. In keeping with the theme of ‘innovations, interruptions, and regenerations’, I examine how each of these remediation moments produced both mundane but also unexpected outcomes emerging from biopolitical and social practices.